PRELIMINARY REMARK
This is the third of a series of texts that should be
read in the following order
Movement conjuring signs
Sonorous
beings and absolute music
Auditory
mimesis and music
Whoever is not familiar with the concept of 'mimesis' should
first read
'Mimesis'
INTRODUCTION
Especially from the 19th century onwards, music - in particular 'absolute
music' - used to be invoked as the paradigm of an 'abstract',
non-narrative art, where sound, otherwise than form or colour in
painting, would not be subordinated to the task of imitating - just
think of Eduard Hanslick's statement that music is no more than 'tönend
bewegte Formen'. As a consequence of the increasing taboo on mimesis,
music came to serve as an example to all the arts that wanted to get
rid of the 'narrative' to become 'abstract' like music - think of Walter Pater's 'All art aspires to the condition of music.'
The aspiration was strongest with painters, who, in their fervour to
distance themselves from photography, threatened to betray the very
essence of painting. Meanwhile, the idea that music would be an abstract art - just
like architecture - has become so established that it is one of the
strongest obstacles to the restoration of the idea the art is mimesis.
To convincingly demonstrate that - or in how far - music is mimesis, is
therefore the touchstone of every theory of mimesis, and it is to this
task that this text is devoted.
Let us first clearly state that not all music is mimetic. In 'movement conjuring signs',
we described the domain of speech and dance music and showed that
there is no talk here of mimesis, but of semiosis: speech music does not
imitate speakers or singers but signifies their speaking and singing,
and dance music does not imitate dancers, but signifies their dancing.
The question is then what kind of music is mimetic.
Second, we have to point to the fact that, next to musical mimesis,
there is also ordinary auditory mimesis - auditory mimesis where
non-musical auditory appearances are duplicated. Anticipating what
follows, we can sketch the following scheme:
|
||||
semiosis | (auditory) mimesis | |||
music |
ordinary auditory mimesis |
|||
non-mimetic music |
musical auditory mimesis |
|||
Finally, it is essential to realise that
there are countless forms of combinations of all these kinds of auditory
mimesis and the many kinds of music - and that only the isolation of the
constituting elements allows for making meaningful statements on the
phenomena that are subsumed under the common denominator 'music'.
In the text below, we will first examine the different kinds of auditory
mimesis and then describe the many ways in which they can be combined with each
other and with the many kinds of non-mimetic (speech and dance) music.
AUDITORY MIMESIS
Mimesis is the imitating of objects or beings through the duplication of
one of their sensory appearances. With visual mimesis (think of the
paradigmatic examples of the mirror and the photo), something is
imitated through the duplication of its visual appearance. With auditory mimesis,
something is imitated through the duplication of its auditory appearance (think
of the obvious example of the recording of a voice or of a bird song).
Just like Narcis' mirror for visual mimesis, Echo's echo is the paradigm
for auditory mimesis (For further elaboration, see: 'Mimesis')
We can divide the domain of auditory mimesis into subdomains, according
to the kind of auditory appearance that is duplicated.
the audible world | ||
non-intentional | intentional | |
sounds | verbal language | musical appearance |
|
To begin with, there is the domain of the unintended sounds that are
audible with diverse kinds of friction and movements: the roar of an
avalanche or thunder, the howling of the storm, the trotting of horses,
the drone of boots, the sound of breathing, breaking glass and what have
you. When these auditory
appearances are duplicated in view of the imitation of the concomitant
phenomena, we are dealing with ordinary auditory mimesis. The duplicate
can be made by recording, with the voice or musical instruments, or with
sound machines (like the wind machines in the theatre). Next to
uncompleted ordinary auditory mimesis
- the duplicating of existing auditory appearances of existing objects
and beings, there is also completed
ordinary mimesis - the imitation of imaginary beings
that owe their existing to the creation of an auditory appearance, as
with many electronic music, 'musique concrète', or playing instruments in
an unconventional way.
Next, there is the domain of the intended - intentional - sounds that
are produced as signs by (existing or imaginary) beings. This domain
falls apart in the domain of human speech and the domain of musical
appearances.Let us first examine the domain of human speech. Speech can by
duplicated in view of imitating a character. This can be done by
recording (like in radio plays or film), but also by another speaker
(a reciter or an audiovisual actor), in which case we are still dealing
wit ordinary auditory mimesis. But when it is the voice that duplicates
speach, we are dealing with the domain of verbal
or literary auditory mimesis.
Next to uncompleted verbal auditory mimesis, there is also completed
verbal mimesis, when imaginary beings - speakers of nonexistent or
incomprehensible languages - are imitated through the production of
their verbal appearances, as with Hugo Ball or Kurt Schwitters (or with
electronic deformation of speech) (for wordless speech music, as in 'Speakings'
of Jonathan Harvey, see below).
Next to the domain of speech there is the domain of the (existing or
imaginary) musical appearances - from singing birds, over lamenting
Ariannas, to the sonorous beings that we described in 'sonorous
beings in musical space'. Also these musical appearances can be
duplicated in view of the imitation of the concomitant phenomena or
beings through recording, in which case we are dealing with ordinary
mimesis again. But, when the duplication is realised by the human voice or
musical instruments, we can speak of
musical auditory mimesis (musical imitation,
musical mimesis): mimesis of existing or imaginary phenomena and beings
with a musical auditory appearance. An overview:
duplicated by ← | the audible world | → duplicated by | |||||||
↓ | ↓ | ||||||||
ordinary auditory mimesis |
everything ← except speech and music |
sounds | |||||||
verbal language | speech → | verbal auditory mimesis | |||||||
musical appearance | music → | musical auditory mimesis | |||||||
MUSICAL MIMESIS (1): DOMAINS
The domain of musical mimesis can be divided according to the kind of
musical appearance that is duplicated:
First, there is the domain of existing musical appearances - the domain
of 'found music'. To this domain belong all the non-verbal intentional
signs that are produced by animals (song of whales, howling of wolves,
but foremost the song of birds like in 'Le
chant des oiseaux' of Janequin, Beethoven's Pastorale, Respighi's
'Pini di Roma' or Per Norgaard 'D'Monstrantz Voogeli', yes even of
fighting apes, like in the Balinese
Kecak), but
above all by man (the many auditory expressions of man like weeping,
laughing, sighing, screaming, which, as described in 'movement conjuring signs'
are often condensed with words, as well as the many auditory signals and
signs like in 'Voulez ouyr les cris
de Paris' of Janequin, all sung speech music and dance music). To
this subdomain also belong the musical signals produced by all
kinds of instruments: think of military signals, bells, train whistles,
sirens, fog horns, ringtones and what have you,
Next tot the domain of existing musical appearances, there is also the
large domain of phenomena or beings that owe their existence to
mimesis (completed mimesis). There are in the first place the existing
beings whose auditory appearance is musicalised: bumble bees
in Rimsky-Korsakov, chicken in 'La Poule' of Rameau, dogs (think of the singing dogs in 'Lady and the
tramp'), cats (like in Rossini's
'Duetto buffo di due gatti'), the laughing of witches with Purcell or
the cries of the Valkyries in Wagner, the wordless speech of imaginary
beings like in Speakings
of Jonathan Harvey, the imitations of the human voice on the
discontinuous sound spectrum of the piano by
Peter Ablinger
(in the wake of Godfried-Willem Raes from Logos),
and the musicalised 'Typewriter' of Leroy Anderson.
Next, there is the large domain of the existing or imaginary singers and musicians
like the Bremer Stadtmusikanten, the Lorelei and the Sirens, the
lamenting Arianna of
Monteverdi, the singing
monks of Ketelby, the Jews that sing 'Shema Yisroel' in Schönberg's
Survivor from Warsaw, the military fanfare of the Roman legion in
Pini di Roma
of Resphighi. And, last but not least, the extensive domain of of the
imaginary wordless singers (singing instrumental speech melodies like that of Mahlers Adagietto).
The most important domain of the imaginary beings with a musical
appearance, however, is the domain of the sonorous beings that we
described in 'sonorous
beings in musical space', where we demonstrated how they are created
in that singers or musicians duplicate their musical appearance: the
realm of absolute music.
This results in the following survey:
|
||
musical mimesis | ||
musical appearances of existing beings | musical appearances of imaginary beings | |
musicalised (non)existing beings | sonorous beings | |
non-existing singers and musicians | ||
ditto wordless singers and musicians | ||
MUSICAL MIMESIS (2):
MUSICAL MIMESIS IS IMITATING THROUGH PLAYING MUSIC
Whereas the concept of 'verbal mimesis' - the auditory imitation of
Hamlet through duplicating his speaking - is not problematic,
the concept of 'musical mimesis' - the auditory imitation of Arianna
through duplicating her lament - is from way back the source of the
endless misunderstandings that continue to haunt the philosophy of music
(see Kivy).
We already dealt with one of these misconceptions in our text ' 'sonorous
beings in musical space': the idea that absolute music would be
non-mimetic. Even more confusing are the misconceptions about what
imitates what in one of the oldest paradigms of musical mimesis:
Monteverdi's Lamento d'Arianna. Let us therefore set things straight.
Let us begin with a terminological question. There is no such thing as
imitated music - or broader: an imitated sound - except as imitation in
the performative sense: the making of a (monosensorial) duplicate
through recording or through playing the music - not in the sense of an
'auditory image' of the music or the sound in question. Precisely
the making of such a duplicate is a means of imitating (in the
perceptive sense) singers or musicians or musical phenomena or beings.
Whoever imitates the song of a bird (in the performative sense of
playing the same tones on a flute) makes a (monosensorial) duplicate of
that song, and such a duplicate is an imitation (in the perceptive sense
of an 'auditory image') of a singing bird. Or whoever 'imitates' the
lamenting of Arianna, makes a (monosensorial) duplicate of that sound,
and that duplicate is an imitation (in de perceptive sense of an 'auditory
image) of the lamenting Arianna. To avoid any ambiguity in the use of
the word 'imitation', we will rigorously use the formula 'to duplicate
the auditory appearance in view of the imitation of the concomitant
phenomenon or being'. We do not say that Monteverdi's 'Lamento
d'Arianna' is the imitation of a lament, but rather that it is an auditory
duplicate of such a lament, and that precisely the making of such a
duplicate
(the singing of the lament) - is an imitation (an auditory image) of the
lamenting Arianna, because it only duplicates the auditory appearance of
Arianna, and not her visual or tactile appearance as well. Similarly,
the visual appearance of the David of Michelangelo is a visual duplicate
of the original David, and that visual duplicate is a visual image of
the original David, because it only provides the visual appearance and
not also his auditory, tactile ... appearance. The music as such (the
lament of Arianna as sung by the singer) cannot be distinguished from
the lament of the (imaginary) original Arianna, just like the visual
appearance of the original David cannot be distinguished from the visual
appearance of the sculpted marble block.
Although there is no such a thing as 'imitated music' in the perceptive
sense, there is something like mimetic music ('imitative music'): the duplicating (playing, singing) of musical appearances
with musical instruments or the human voice, in view of the imitating
of the concomitant phenomena - the phenomena that normally produce the
appearance in question. Monteverdi's 'Lamento
d'Arianna' is not the imitation of a lament, but the imitation of the
lamenting Arianna through the singing of her lament - through the
production of a duplicate of her lament. We can also speak of musical
mimesis or musical imitation: the terms clearly indicates that we are not
dealing with the imitation of music, but rather with imitating through
(the playing of) music: just like with verbal imitation, we are not
imitating words, but a character through duplicating his words.
Whether music is mimetic or not, cannot be decided through hearing the music
as such, but only through assessing the relation between the sound
source and the music: is the sound source the original bearer of the appearance or not.
That goes not only for musical mimesis: with auditory mimesis as such,
the auditory
appearance is not provided by the original phenomenon or being (thunder,
a lamenting woman, a musicalised clock or a sonorous being), but by
loudspeakers, singers or musicians.
And that goes not only for musical or auditory mimesis, but for every
kind of mimesis: also the smile of the Mona Lisa does not differ from
the smile of the (imaginary) original. What makes the painting of such a
smile an imitation, is that it is produced by a panel and not by the
original Mona Lisa.
The resonating loudspeakers, the manipulating of the wind machine, the
singing of the singer or the playing of the musician are merely the
medium bearers of the auditory appearance, the musical counterparts of
the speaking of the actor who plays Hamlet, or the auditory counterpart
of the canvas or the screen of the film. Just like the Mona Lisa does
only appear as a three-dimensional animated person when we forget that we
are dealing with paint on a panel, just so do Hamlet or Arianna only
appear when we forget that we are dealing with an actor or a singer.
To my knowledge, no author has adequately described this state of
affairs. The consequences are dramatic. All the theories that want to
explain what auditory mimesis (or to deny that music would be mimetic),
turn out to be mere theories of what an auditory appearance is.
Exemplary are the countless attempts at explaining how 'music' can be
expressive - why Arianna's lament is a lament. That is a problem for semiology or psychology, whereas the question that is relevant to the
philosophy of art is wherein ordinary, non-mimetic music differs from
mimetic music - how it is that we have the impression to hear Arianna
where there is only a singer singing. A common misunderstanding is the
statement that the lament of Monteverdi would be an 'imitation' or an
'analogy' to a real lament. At best, a real lament may have been used as
a model when conceiving the lament of Arianna (when designing the
original), but, what makes Arianna's lament a musical imitation is not
the relation between the original in the music and an original in the
real world that served as a model, but the simple fact that it is not
Arianna that sings the lament, but a singer. A similar analysis applies
to absolute music (see 'sonorous
beings in de musical space'): moving tones are not imitations, but
rather duplicates of the auditory appearance of imaginary sonorous
beings, produced by the musicians. And a similar analyse applies to the
visual image as well: the question is not why a smile expresses what it
expresses, but rather how it is that; when perceiving this visual
configuration on a two-dimensional panel, we have the certain impression
that there is an animated three-dimensional being of flesh and blood.
MUSICAL MIMESIS (3): DIFFERENT
WAYS OF DUPLICATING A MUSICAL APPEARANCE
It is not always easy to answer the question whether music is mimetic
or not - whether the musicians are the original producers of the auditory
appearance. There are different ways of duplicating a musical
appearance, and some of them are rather confusing.
The least problematic method is the recording of an musical auditory
appearance and its rendition through loudspeakers: the recording of bird
song, a mother singing a lullaby, a vocal or instrumental singer,
or a musician playing absolute music. Such a recording - ordinary
auditory mimesis - is the auditory
counterpart of the visual photo. And just like with a photo, there is no
doubt that we are dealing with an imitation: just like we cannot touch
what is duplicated visually on the photograph, we cannot see what is
recorded.
Equally unproblematic are the cases of auditory imitation where the
musical auditory appearance
is duplicated through another sound source than the original one, as
when birds are imitated on the piano, or cats on the violin. When
Rossini's cat's duet is performed, we hear cats but see singers.
Problems arise only when we are dealing with completed mimesis so that
there is no comparison with an existing original. That is especially the
case with the imitation of sonorous beings in absolute
music, where the problem is enhanced in that it is difficult to
conceive of purely sonorous beings, so that we are all to readily
inclined to resort to the idea of an expressive singer or musician. Only
when we fully realise that the sounds in musical space
are monosensorial beings, do we recognise that the instruments are not
the original sound source (which, by the way, can be rendered more or
less adequately: think of the various instrumental versions of Bach's
fugues).
More problematic are the cases where the musical auditory appearance is
duplicated with a similar sound source: the imitation Arianna's lament
with a voice, the imitation of Elvis Presley with a voice and a guitar,
the imitation of Glenn Gould playing Bach by a pianist. These cases are
comparable with the duplication of the audiovisual appearance of
characters by actors. Here, it is tempting to forget that there is a
difference between the imitating singers and musician and the real ones.
The danger is not so great when existing singers or musicians are
imitated - think of Edith Piaff: the differences between the original in
the real world and the imitation mostly catch the eye. But the danger is real when that is not
the case, as when Schubert imitates a 'Leiermann' or Stravinsky street
musicians in his Petrushka; because there are no individual clues, it is
mostly the context that suggests that we are dealing with imitations
altogether (the text in the case of Schubert, or the story in Petrushka)
and/or the fact that the original instruments are replaced with other
ones, like the piano in Der Leiermann or wind instruments in Petrushka.
The danger is acute, when we are dealing with imaginary singers like the
lamenting Arianna or the Jews that sing 'Shema Yisroel' in Schönberg's
Survivor from Warsaw. Since we are dealing
with completed mimesis, there is, just like with absolute music, no
comparison with an existing original, although, unlike with absolute
music, we have no difficulty in imagining such an original.
And the confusion is practically inevitable when the singer or the
musician imitates himself. In the supposition that the song is
autobiographical, 'Ne me quittes pas'
was at best a direct expression of Brel at the moment of its creation,
but with every repetition, Brel is staging himself. The phenomenon has
become the rule since lyric songs are no longer performed by random
performers, but, as a consequence of new ways of distribution (radio,
recording) the performance is monopolised by a privileged performer. If 'Ne me quittes pas'
were a song that, like those of Schubert, were performed by various
singers, the version of Brel would be perceived as the imitation of an
imaginary lover by Jacques Brel. But, since Brel, otherwise than the
singers who interpret Arianna's lament, is the standard performer, it
becomes even more difficult to make the already problematic distinction
between the imaginary Brel and the real Brel that sings his song.
Outright confusing, finally, are the cases of double mimesis: the cases
where the imitated singers or musicians play absolute music and hence
imitate sonorous beings in their turn. Problematic is foremost the
recognition that we are dealing with musical imitation (of the
performance of Bach by Glenn Gould). These cases of double
imitation have to be discerned ffom the cases where the music is
duplicated without duplicating a particular interpretation: as when a
musician just interprets a score or sings a cover. Also recordings
(ordinary auditory mimesis) of
Bach played by a particular interpreter can be heard as duplicates of
the music, and not as duplicates of the interpretation as well.
As soon as we rely on the proper theoretical model, it appears, hence,
that there is only a difference qua domain between musical imitations of
the musical appearance of existing beings (from birds to singers or
musicians), of musicalised existing beings, of wordless speakers and
singers, of imaginary singers and musicians, and, finally, of sonorous
beings in musical space. The domains themselves can be ranged on a
continuum or probability: from imitation of existing musical appearances, over
imaginary but 'probable' appearances (like those of Arianna), to
imaginary but improbable (those of the sonorous beings of absolute music).
Before describing the combinations of ordinary, verbal and musical auditory mimesis,
we have first to consider a second kind of mimetic music:
IMAGE CONJURING MUSIC
Let us go back to the domain of non-mimetic music - the ordinary speech and dance music.
These bear the germ of another kind of mimesis. In that the production
of movement conjuring signs becomes exherent to the movements, dance music is no longer restricted to
movements with inherent sounds, like speaking. On the one hand, that
unleashes the imagination in conceiving of new kinds of movements: dance
movements as well as ways of playing. But, on the other hand, that
creates the possibility to conjure up movements that can no longer be
performed by the human body: movements of non-human beings like animals,
machines, natural phenomena, or movements of imaginary beings
as such.
There are two possible reactions on such a bloom of the
design of movement conjuring signs. A first reaction is that music continues to function
as dance music - as music that has to conjure up movements of human
bodies. This leads to the many kinds of mimetic dances - forms of visual
mimesis that does not concern us here, because it is no auditory, but
visual mimesis. Suffice it to remark that there is a whole spectrum of
such mimetic dances: from dances imitating activities like work and war,
over imitations of animals, to imitations of dragons, monsters and
ghosts. The imitation is mostly restricted to partial filling in of the
movement - think of movements of the arms as if it were the wings of a
bird, so that there is no visual resemblance. We
can compare with the role play of children, where the child imagines
being a character and adds to this mental representation partial
immediate imitations of movements (see 'Imitation
and play').
But there is another way out: the listener can give up his urge to dance
altogether. Instead of moving the arms to 'imitate' the movement of the
wings of birds or of the coupling rods of a locomotive, he can imagine a
bird or a locomotive and have the representations execute the conjured movements. The movement conjuring signs are transformed into
image
conjuring signs - dance music becomes
image conjuring music. That entails a transition from unmediated to
mediated mimesis: the
conjuring up of representations through words or images - or: music.
Since movements with inherent sounds are predestined to unmediated auditory mimesis,
image conjuring music has a predilection for movements that make no
noise (the flying of birds) or the conjuring up of standstill (the
endless steppes). Whereas verbal image conjuring signs do not contain
instructions for the tempo and the duration of events, musical image
conjuring signs movements prescribe the tempo and the duration of the
movement in 'real time'.
It is important to remind that image conjuring music, just like
speech and dance music consists of predominantly analog signs:
it does not resemble the auditory appearance of the imaginary objects or
beings - it is not an imitation, but a sign for (representations) of
movements. We
do not conceive of the sugar plum fairy of Tchaikovsky as a fairy that
sounds like a glass xylophone, but rather as a fragile being.
Let us give a brief survey of the phenomena and beings whose
representation can be conjured up through image conjuring music.
To begin with, there are the (inaudible) movements of inanimate beings:
the waves (Der heilige Franziskus von Paula über Wogen schreitend or Debussy's
'La Mer', fontains (Lisztz's 'Les jeux d'eaux de la Villa d'Este'), the
water of the Rhine (Wagner's 'Vorspiel' to Rheingold),
the flickering of light on water (Schönberg's 'Farben') or the flashing
of the lightning (Beethoven's 'Pastorale'). Not only movement, but also
standstill can be conjured up: the motionless see (Monteverdi's 'Hor ch’el
ciel'), an impressive castle (Smetana), the endless steppes (Borodin's
'Steppes of Central Asia').
Next, there are the countless examples of movements of animals: the
plodding hoofs of the camels in Borodin's 'Steppes of Central Asia',
the swimming of fish (Schubert's 'Die Forelle'), the flight of birds (Schubert's
'Die Krähe'), the flutter of angels' wings (Monteverdi's 'Et hi tres').
Also the representation of the movement of vehicles can be conjured up.
Very popular is the representation of the up and down motion of
connecting rods of a locomotive (Steve Reich's Different Trains).
More ambivalent is, finally, the status of the movement conjuring signs
that can be executed by human beings (see 'Proteus' below). It applies
also here that they conjure up images when there are additional verbal
clues. But when there are no such clues, there is only the perception of
an impulse that is not executed. When we restrict ourselves to examples
where there are verbal clues, there are, to begin with, ordinary
movements like walking (Berlioz' 'Harold en Italie') or treading the ice
(Vivaldi's 'Winter').
More important are expressive movements. There are inconspicuous
expressive movements like the shivering in Purcell's 'Cold
song', the teeth chattering in Vivaldi's winter, the quivering in
Berlioz' 'La Mort de Cléopatre'). There are also the more conspicuous
expressive movements of arms, trunk or the whole body (think of the many
examples of expressive strides like in Chopin's funeral march of
Wagner's Siegfried's Tod).
Let us remark that also the duplicate of an auditory appearance can
function as an image conjuring sign: as when the bird song conjures up
the representation of a bird. A good example are the many sounds in
Salvatore Sciarrino's 'Autoritratto nella notte'.
But these appearances can also be heard as a pure auditory imitation,
without conjuring images. As a rule, however, image conjuring is here
prevented in that many auditory imitations are part of audiovisual
imitations, like in film.
AUDITORY EN MUSICAL MIMESIS
It is apparent, then, that there are two kinds of musical mimesis;
unmediated
musical mimesis and mediated musical mimesis. Only unmediated
musical mimesis is auditory mimesis. Mediated musical mimesis is not auditory:
that the image conjuring signs are audible, just like the words in image conjuring (=
narrative) literature, does not make the representations auditory. The
sensory domains of the representations are rather non-auditory per
definition; when a train whistle is used to conjure up the image of a
train, it is no longer necessary to make an auditory representation of
that whistle. Neither does image conjuring music become a visual
image when it is written down in a score: also a novel or a poem are not
transformed into a visual image when the words are written.
To give account of these two kinds of musical mimesis, we have to extend
the above scheme of auditory scheme above as follows:
auditory mimesis | |||
non-intentional | intentional | ||
sounds | verbal language | musical appearance | |
ordinary auditory mimesis | verbal mimesis | musical auditory mimesis | |
= | |||
unmediated musical mimesis | mediated musical mimesis |
It is apparent, then, that auditory mimesis and musical mimesis are two
domains that are not co-extensive, they merely overlap.
Let us remark that we could make a similar distinction for the two other
domains: there is also unmediated and mediated verbal mimesis, and there is also unmediated mimesis of
objects and mediated mimesis through objects (think of commemorative
sites). But it would be confusing to try to combine this scheme with a
generalised distinction between unmediated and mediated (unless we would
replace auditory mimesis with unmediated mimesis as such).
THE COMMUNITY OF
IMAGINARY BEINGS: SYMPATHETIC
MIMESIS (2)
In 'sonorous beings in musical space'
we have seen that, when in absolute music the movement of the sonorous beings is
organised through movement conjuring signs,
these not only conjure up the movement of the sonorous beings, but also
those of the listener and the musicians, although it is not their body
that is set in motion, but the sonorous soul that they have become
through identification with the moving sound, and we described how they
thus become part of the community of sonorous souls. That applies not
only to the sonorous beings of music in particular, but for all the
phenomena and beings whose auditory appearances are duplicated in view
of the imitation of the concomitant phenomena or beings - as far as they
are organised by movement conjuring signs: also Rameau's chicken, Purcell's laughing witches,
Montverdi's lamenting Arianna and Respighi's Roman fanfare invite us to join
the performance of their auditory expressions, their singing or their
playing.
Let us first examine the situation in the case of musical imitations of
beings that are more earthly than the sonorous beings of absolute music:
singing birds, musicalised appearances, and existing or imaginary
singers and musicians.
In as far as the musical appearance of these beings contains movement conjuring
signs, these signs also conjure up our movements. But, otherwise that
with absolute music, that conjures up the movement of sonorous beings,
these signs are meant for human beings or at least for beings with whom
we have the singing in common. Nothing prevents us from singing with
Arianne or Jacques Brel, or to play with the Leiermann or Chuck Berry,
and even less prevents us from singing along with instrumental singers.
But since also in these cases we are not the imitated beings, we become
their fellow-performers (effectively, or merely in our imagination). An
imaginary community is constituted also here, albeit that this time we
do not have to ascend in musical space as sonorous beings and leave our
bodies behind: we sing and play in the same three-dimensional world as
that of the imitated beings. That does not prevent the community of
singing and playing bodies to be imaginary, and not real, like that of the
singers of speech music and the dancers of dance music: our bodies are
merely the medium bearers. Apart from that, we sound just like Arianna.
But, since our imitation is only auditory, it is all too visible that we
are not Ariannas. Next to the imaginary community of lamenting Arianna',
and provided all the members of the community proceed to actual singing
or playing, there is also a real visual community of performers of the lamenting
Arianna. More often, all the listeners content themselves with
identifying themselves with the singer on the stage, who imitates
the imaginary singer also visually, and to performing vicarious movements
like rocking the hips or waving the arms in the air.
With image conjuring music, things are different. That the images
are conjured up through movement conjuring signs, does not mean that
the images themselves contain (auditory) movement conjuring sings. The movement conjuring signs
themselves can elicit the movements of the listeners - on which, more in
the next paragraph.
IMPLOSION OF MIMETIC MUSIC IN NON-MIMETIC MUSIC AND THE PROBLEM OF
EXPRESSION
In 'sonorous beings and
musical space' we also described how the use of movement conjuring signs
incited the listener to move or to sing or play along, and how the world
of the sonorous beings was supplemented with a world of singing and
playing bodies, and how this redoubling threatened to elliptically be
read as a single world, whereby the movement of the sonorous beings is
read as the expression of the singers or the musicians).
Also the remaining forms of mimetic music, where not the musical appearances
of sonorous beings are duplicated, but that of existing or imaginary
singers and musicians, of musicalised beings or wordless singers, can
tempt the listeners to sing of or play along. As described above, a
second world emerges, with the difference that the singer is here
perceived as an auditory appearance in real space, where the singing
body is merely a medium bearer. Here it is not so much musical space
that threatens to implode, bur rather the real world that tends to be
equated with the imaginary world - in that the singers deem themselves Arianna.
The danger is not so great when the original is a concrete person -
think of Edith Piaff of Jacques Brel
- or when it is non-human: few listeners will identify with chicken.
But the dangers is acute when the original is a general (human) category
like 'the' Leiermann, or imaginary human beings like Arianna: it is
impossible to assess a difference between the original sound source (the
voice of the original singer or musician) and that of the imitating
singers.
The fellow singers or players feel tempted to experience their singing
or playing as their own expression. Also here, an elliptical reading
threatens to obliterate the difference between non-mimetic and
mimetic music, to the effect that also mimetic music is
experienced as the auditory appearance (the 'expression') of the singer
or the musician (or the composer).
With image conjuring music, the world of the conjured images can equally be supplemented with a second layer in the real world.
Precisely because we are often dealing here with music with a strong
metrical character (think of Different Trains of Steve Reich), we cannot
resist the temptation to move the movement conjuring signs - for
instance by moving the arms in an effort to imitate the connecting rods of
the train. Also here, the imaginary community of all those who deem
themselves a train is supplemented with the community of all those who
imitate trains through the movements of their arms: here, the mimetic
character of the music is obfuscated through a shift to visual mimesis (like
with ballet): the reduction of image conjuring sings to movement conjuring signs. Where
that is not possible - think of a concert hall - there is always the
possibility of identifying with the musician who produces the movement conjuring signs: we
feel like a kind of magician who conjures up the images through playing
the music.
In all these cases, the idea of a mimetic dimension threatens to disappear:
with absolute music, musical space threatens to collapse; with the
musical imitation of
musical appearances the difference between a singer and a musician and
their imitations threatens to be overlooked; with image conjuring music
the reduction of
image conjuring signs to movement conjuring signs for unmediated
visual mimesis threatens to obfuscate the idea that there is also
something like image conjuring music. Thus, the way is
paved for a further reduction of the idea of music: music as 'expression'
- after the example of speech music - where also dance music, which is
not expressive, seems to be excluded from the realm of music.
PROTEUS (1): POLYINTERPRETABILITY
AND CONDENSATION OF DIVERSE KINDS OF MIMETIC MUSIC
Up to know, we concentrated on discerning the diverse kinds of music:
non-mimetic music versus mimetic music, which can be
unmediated or mediated. Time has come to remind of the fact that in real
music often diverse kinds of music are combined or condensed, or that one and
the same music can be read in alternative ways altogether.
In 'sonorous beings in musical space' we
already pointed to the fact that all
speech and dance music can also be read as absolute music, and
that, conversely, many absolute music can also be read as speech
or dance music. Here, we only have to add that the possibilities of
double reading only increase when we take into account the full array of
kinds of mimetic music.
To begin with, it is apparent that not only non-mimetic speech and dance music (the
virtuoso play music included) can be read as absolute music, but also
the non-absolute variants of mimetic music, especially the imitations of
vocal or instrumental singers or of musicalised beings.
Conversely, how eager the sonorous beings of absolute music may be to
leave their vicarious sound sources behind in the real world, it may be
more or less tempting to continue to hear them as singing voices, and,
in the wake thereof, to read the accompaniment as a movement conjuring sign
for those singing beings (which are then often visually represented in
our minds). Thus, Fratres can be heard as homophonous moving sounds, but
also as the auditory imitation of a procession of singing monks. Or when
pizzicati are added, the reading of
overture to
the third act of the Traviata suddenly
invites to read the up to then absolute music as a singing being that
moves expressively.
Next, we can read non-mimetic as well as (unmediated) mimetic music as image conjuring
(and hence mediated) music. Any dance music -
especially when it is not so easily performable by the human body - and
any absolute music - especially if it reminds of the movements of
non-human beings - may conjure up visual representations of the
movements of existing or imaginary beings - think of the
Finale
presto from the second piano sonata of Chopin,
where Anton Rubinstein heard 'Winds
of night sweeping over churchyard graves', Tausig 'the ghost
of the departed wandering about" and Cortot' the freezing whirlwind
descending on tombs.' Perhaps even more important is that, as we have
seen above, conversely, many an
image conjuring music may invite the listener to identify with what is
represented and to perform (a part of) its movements with his human body ('Saint
Francis walking on the waves' of Liszt, or 'Different trains' of Steve Reich),
if we do not read it as absolute music from the beginning - as is the
case with most 'program music' - from Liszt's 'Après une lecture de
Dante' to Leroy's' 'typewriter song'.
It is evident, however, that not every music can be read as one pleases.
There are, to begin with, the many cases of unambiguously one-sided
music, where a specialised reading is the most appropriate. With many
speech music, the melodic line does not amount to more than tonal
structuring, so that it does not invite to a reading as moving sound.
That holds even more of most dance music, where it is only the added
speech music that may invite to a reading as moving sound. A reading of image conjuring music as absolute music is
only appropriate when it is interesting as absolute music. Often, the
signs are of little interest (see 'Different trains' of Steve Reich), so
that an attempt at reading them as absolute music is soon given up. That
is the reason why many of the more refined program music also consists
of vocal or instrumental speech music, not to mention the often
important contribution of absolute music (see below: combinations).
But, in other cases, a multiple reading seems to be deliberately
intended, so that it is not only impossible to determine which reading
is most appropriate, but superfluous, since only a double reading gives
full account of the richness of the music. That is the case with many a
melody that can be read either as the movement of a sonorous being or as
(imitative) speech music (think of the prayer in the Offertorium andHostias
of Berlioz Requiem or of
Agurida, where you do not know whether a singer is cursing
or a sonorous being is floating through the air), as instrumental, speechless
speech music (think of the melody of the Adagietto that seems to be
sung by a kind of 'World Soul'), or, finally, as movement conjuring sign
for movements of the entire body or of expressive gestures, that are
however not executed, and hence lead to the visual representation of
beings that make the expressive gestures or that are appropriate to the
auditory expression of the corollary speech music (think of the melody
of the Mondscheinsonate, the rudimentary melody of the Offertorium and
the Hostias from the Requiem of Berlioz, or of the melody of the funeral
march of Chopin). An impressive example of a perfect condensation of image
conjuring music and absolute music is the 'Vorspiel'
to 'Das Rheingold', where the reading as absolute music is even more
convincing than the reading as image conjuring music. In all these cases, unequivocal lecture is impossible.
Double reading is facilitated when the composer has the same melody
resound first with words and then without, just by having it played by an
instrument. When a melody is sung, the temptation to read it as mimetic
speech music is stronger, whereas when it is played on an instrument, we
feel rather inclined to read it as moving sound. Such alternate reading
is exemplary in the
Liebestod' in Tristan and Isolde, that is in fact a kind of duet, if
not a trio or quartet:
the melodies are now sung, now played, so that now the emphasis is on
the movement of sonorous beings, then on the expressive speech music.
The result is that in both cases there is a double reading of the
melody: the instruments seem to sing and the voices sound like a moving
sound.
Another impressive example is the singing choir that is embedded in a
'singing' orchestra' in Berlioz'
Hostias, or the
melodies that accompany the song the Midnight in the
Mitternachtslied of Mahler, or the falling melodies at the end of his 'Der Abschied'. In how
far speech music can also be read as absolute music (as moving sound) can
be gauged from the degree to which it is still heard
as a song when played instrumentally. The
Liebestod of
Wagner does not collapse in a purely orchestral version, whereas
Schubert's Erlkönig loses much of its power in Liszt's piano transcription. The
condensation of absolute music with mimetic speech and dance music
implies a reduplication of the singer: on the one hand, he is a singer
in real space, on the other a sonorous soul that is moving in
musical space. As long as we are only listening, that conflict is not
manifest. But when we are dealing with an audiovisual imitation, there
is often an overt contradiction: thus, the visual Tristan and Isolde are
locked in each other's embrace, whereas their souls (together with those
of other
singers and a singing orchestra) are moving on love waves. Thus, in 'L'ho
perduta', the visual Barbarina is searching on the ground, while her
soul is making movements that are more adequately rendered in the
Taviani film
'Kaos'. Such redoubling is so convincing, because it is a reflection of
the divide between the outer appearance of the body and the inner soul.
Another technique that favours double reading is polyphony: each voice
sounds as speech music, but in that it begins to move independently from
other voices, it is soon also read as sound moving in musical space. The
often astounding plenitude is not so much an effect of the course
of the singles voices, as rather of the expressiveness and the structuring
dynamics of the tonal relations - the chords through which the voices
are moving. Thus originates the often overwhelming impression of a
community of
like-minded singers, who at the same time are floating in the higher
regions of musical space (Hymn
of the Cherubim of Tchaikovsky), or the overwhelming impression of
voices whose individual mourning only unfolds to a collective lament
when the voices are joined in a dizzying spatial architecture of
sonorous beings that move through various expressive positions in
musical space (Hear my prayer
o Lord! of Purcell).
Let us remark that such double reading is all the more fruitful - or:
is only possible - when we are not seduced to an elliptic reading, that
would obfuscate the richness of the double phenomenon. Let us equally remark
that in all these cases the ascent of musical space is no longer
manifest - but therefore no less effective.
PROTEUS (2): ADDITIVE COMBINATION
OF DIVERSE KINDS OF MIMETIC MUSIC
Next to the effective condensation that necessitates a simultaneous
double reading, there is also the possibility to combine two or more one-sided
kinds of music additively. The addition may be simultaneous (think of a
mimetic speech melody over a movement conjuring accompaniment), or successive
(think of the prisoners singing against a background of absolute music in 'A
survivor in Warsaw').
-
Next to the combination of auditory imitation of existing musical
beings (like a cuckoo) or of musicalised beings (like the bumblebee) or
(existing or imaginary) singers or musicians with sonorous beings, also
the combination of unmediated with mediated musical mimesis is very
popular. In the third part of
Pini di Roma, we have a
combination of the recording of bird song with
image conjuring music. In 'Different Trains' of Steve Reich, recordings
of train whistles are combined with image conjuring signs for the movement of
connecting rods. Far more obvious, however, is the combination of image conjuring signs
with the imitation of imaginary instrumental singers and/or sonorous beings.
That this combination is so popular, is due to the fact that the
movements of existing objects may well be expressive, but do not
necessarily tell something substantial of what is imitated. That is why
many image conjuring music is often supplemented with spoken '(Different Trains) or
sung text, but also with absolute music or mimetic speech music: think
of the melody that is added to the image conjuring signs for walking
elephants in Saint-Saens, or of the melody that is added to Honegger's Pacific 231.
A special case of such additive combination is the imitation of singers
or of musicians who sing or play absolute music (double mimesis),
PROTEUS (3):
COMBINATION OF MIMETIC MUSIC WITH NON-MIMETIC SPEECH MUSIC OR DANCE
MUSIC
Music can also consist of a combination of mimetic and non-mimetic music, simultaneous or
successive.
A first standard formula is the combination of absolute music or mimetic
speech music with dance music through adding a movement conjuring
accompaniment to a melody that can be read as absolute music and/or as
speech music's. The 'accompaniment' is then an exherent
movement conjuring sign for the movement of one or several melodies, as
well as for the movements (expressive movements or dance movements) of
the listener. A striking example is the beginning of the already
mentioned prelude tot the 3th act of La Traviata, where the melody is
first to be heard without accompaniment, until the accompaniment is
added, that consists unambiguously of movement conjuring signs for the
sonorous being or for the instrumental song, as well as for the
expressive movements of the listener. A similar analysis applies to the
Adagio from the string quintet of Schubert.
The combination can also grow from the fusion of dance
music with speech music that we already analysed in 'movement
conjuring signs' in that the speech music
unfolds to mimetic speech music of an imaginary singer or musician. That
is the case when the singer stages himself or another character. The
accompaniment continues to function as real dance music, not only for
the singer, but also for the dancers in the public. Such transition to
mimetic speech music leads to the popular formula of the lyric song
where the singer is also the imaginary singer, or in classical music
were the singer does not coincide with the imaginary (vocal or
instrumental) singer: just think of a standard aria or of Chopin's
funeral march.
Also image conjuring music can be combined with dance music, as when
'Different Trains' would also conjure up a kind of mimetic ballet.
Let us remind that the listeners mostly fail to notice that there is a
combination of non-mimetic and mimetic music, so that the combination is
experience as just 'music', whereby it is assumed that the music is
non-mimetic.
PROTEUS (4): NON-COMPATIBLE READINGS
With condensation and additive combination, we get a composite original.
It should not escape our attention that the originals that appear with
differential reading are not always compatible like those of the Liebestod or
of L'ho
perduta. Especially with absolute reading of
image conjuring signs, there is an often considerable difference between
the originals that are conjured up by the image conjuring signs, and the
readings that appear with absolute reading. That is not only due to the
fact that most movement conjuring signs are analog, whereas in
absolute music they are heard literally. Thus - to give a graphic
example - the up and down of the tones in
'L'Aquarium' of Saint-Saens is no longer interpreted as the back and
forth of the tails of the fish, but as un up and down of a movement in
musical space. Other differences are due to the fact that the movements
that are conjured up by image conjuring signs are movements of visual
bodies in a three-dimensional space, whereas the movements of sounds in
musical space are movements of monosensorial sonorous beings. Thus, the
tones that, in Schubert's
'Die Krähe', are conjuring up the movement of the wings perform totally
different movements as sonorous beings. When read as absolute music, the sustained notes that have
to conjure up the horizontal plane of endless plains of Borodin's 'The steppes of Central-Asia'
are floating over the fathomless depths of musical space. Or the tones
that in Liszt's 'Fontane di Roma' conjure up the image of fountains,
also embody sonorous beings with buoyant energy in musical space. When read as absolute music,
Tchaikovsky's sugar plum fairy is no longer a fragile being. As absolute
music, Leroy's 'Typewriter song' has nothing to do with typing, but
rather with frolicking beings in musical space.
In many cases, the double reading cannot be sustained: there is only
talk of a local break-through: many virtuoso play music often dissolves in
non-mimetic musical formations that only make sense as demonstrations of the skill
of the musician.
Whether double reading is possible - and hence: whether a complex, but
coherent original is created - depends on the way in which the diverse
readings lend themselves to combination or condensation, as is usual in
the best speech music, be it vocal or instrumental.
PREFERENTIAL READING
In 'sonorous beings in musical space'
we pointed to the fact that absolute music can be read as speech music
or dance music, and the other way round, but that there is a
preferential kind of reading for each piece of music (double reading, as
with the Liebestod, included). Here, we have only to add that also many image conjuring music
can be read as absolute music (of more generally: as unmediated musical mimesis)
and the other way round. When double reading leads to incompatible
originals, the preference is for 'one-sided' music for single reading.
AUDITORY MIMESIS AND AUDITIORY DESIGN
In 'Image conjuring
signs', we demonstrated that (non-mimetic) speech and dance music
belong to the domain of musical design. In this text, we have to add
that sounds in general may be used for non-mimetic purposes as well: the
domain of auditory design in general and of musical design in
particular.
There is, to begin with, the design of the countless musical signals
where tones are not used as movementconjuring signs: bells, gongs,
sirens, ringtones, horns, train whistles, military signals and the
domain of 'sonifications': 'translations' of all kind of data in sounds
or tones like in the sonification of
PI.
More important is the design of two kinds of (non-mimetic)
soundscapes: the purely 'temporal
soundscape', where the occurrence of sounds is organised in the temporal
dimension:
think of John Cage's
'Imaginary Landscapes I-V" (1939-1952),
Wolf Vostell's "Fluxus-Symphonie
für 50 Hover-Staubsauger' (1960) or Ligeti's
Poème symphonique' for 100 metronomes (1962). Let us also mention
the countless instruments played interactively by the public (think of
the Baschet brothers) or by some transformatory device. Next to the
temporal soundscap, there is also the (non-mimetic) spatiotemporal soundscape, where
the occurrence of sounds is not only organised in time, but in space as
well: think of compositions like Godfried-Willem Raes"
Symphony for singing bicycles (1980) or of Dirk Veulemans'
'Composition
for eight fire engines' (2006).
CONCLUSION
Whoever forgets that the name 'music' is applicable to such different
kinds of music like speech and dance music, mimetic music (among
which: absolute music) and image conjuring music, is all too easily
tempted to overlook the existence of mimetic music and to understand it
in terms of image conjuring music, but above all in terms of speech music and dance music.
Especially the interpretation in terms of speech music is widespread: it
lies at the roots of attempts at understanding the 'non-abstract' character
of absolute music in terms of expression rather than in terms of mimesis
(music as a 'language of feelings'). That is a particular variant of the
general shift of the mimetic to the semiotic model, endemic since Croce.
On the other hand, the rejection of image conjuring music - the
'literary' program music - is responsible for the quasi ineradicable
misunderstanding that music would not be 'representative' at all, but
'abstract' (Hanslick) - a view that is the complete opposite of the
semiotic interpretation of music. In both cases, it is denied that music
would have something to do with mimesis.
Only the mimetic theory is able to make a clear distinction between all
the kinds of music and to sharpen the ear to the often far reaching
differences between them. And it is only when we are able to make the
appropriate distinctions, that we realise that most music consists of
often complex combinations or condensations of different kinds of music.
The existence of often complex composite originals should prevent us once
and for all from understanding mimesis in terms of the non-moving,
single and visual image, that uses to function as the paradigm of the
image.
© Stefan Beyst, spring 2012.