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'THE METAPHYSICS OF AUTONOMY' |
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Review of
Coeckelbergh, Mark:
The Metaphysics of Autonomy.
The Reconciliation of
Ancient and Modern Ideals of the Person',
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. |
In his first book 'Passion and Liberation' Coeckelbergh opposed the
'passion-view' of the person with the 'action-view' of the autonomous
person. The ideal of the autonomous person is the dominant modern ideal.
In pre-modern times, figures like Plato and Augustine held the
passion-view. In 'Passion and Liberation' Coeckelbergh convincingly
shows how the passion model can be constructed as a fully coherent view
of its own.
In 'The Metaphysics of Autonomy' Coeckelbergh focuses on the modern
ideal of autonomy, that appeals far more to our modern sensibility. He
lays bare the inherent difficulties of the action model and shows how
some of the problems can be solved by integrating some elements of the
passion model. He comes to the conclusion that it is not possible to
construct a model of autonomy without introducing some rather costly
metaphysics.
In a first move, Coeckelberg presents the modern ideal of autonomy. We
want to be beings that are able to govern themselves and their lives. We
do not like other people telling us what to do, want or be. We wish to
be able to evaluate, decide, and do what we want. The ideal is often
linked to the belief that being autonomous is realising oneself as a
person. Coeckelbergh analyses the contributions of Berlin, Christman,
Feinberg, Frankfurt, and Taylor. It appears to be necessary to
distinguish between two kinds of 'self-government': who is in control or
who determines my desires on the one hand, and who is in control or who
determines my life as a whole on the other hand. The ideal of designing
one's own life presupposes the availability of (ideally many)
alternatives. Autonomy may be a capacity or a condition. Autonomy has to
be distinguished from the rival ideal of 'doing what you want' (Hobbes,
Hume, Mill). There is a difference between 'inner' and 'outer' autonomy.
And, finally, the modern ideal of autonomy seems to be morally neutral:
an autonomous person may decide to choose evil .
In a second move, Coeckelbergh contrasts this modern view on autonomy
with the ancient views of Plato and Augustine, where the focus is on
passion rather then on autonomy At first sight, Plato's image of the
charioteer seems to embody the ideal of the one who exercises control
over his 'appetites'. But the charioteer is only able to manage the
horses if and only if he has a vision of the good. He is ruled by the
good rather than by himself. The metaphor of the charioteer can be
understood within a broader context where 'the greatest of goods come to
us through madness', which is totally different from begin moved by
reason. To reach the state of self-control, the person has to have a
vision of the good and to submit to its call. Augustine too holds that
self-control sets man above beasts. Reason has to master the emotions.
But such self-control is only possible through reference to 'the eternal
law', which is of divine origin. Moreover, we depend on God’s grace for
solving the conflict between the flesh and the spirit. This freedom by
the mercy of God is also irreconcilable with the modern ideal of
autonomy. We are faced with the paradoxical sounding conclusion that for
self-rule you need to rely on something that is not yourself.
In a third move Coeckelbergh, points out a gap when we persist in asking
why we want what we want (Frankfurt's second-order desires). There is
the problem of infinite regress: is there a limit to the formation of
higher-order-desires? Frankfurt's decisive identification is not a
solution. Ideals and values (Taylor), the source of the 'Deep Self'
(Wolf) and normative standards (Feinberg) are possible alternatives.
They are 'not me', but enhance rather than limit my autonomy. But they
must still be evaluated, and in order to avoid the problem of infinite
regress, we have to rely on an ultimate point of reference. Coeckelbergh
then tries to fill the gap by using Plato and Augustine. Plato's vision
of the good is a possible solution to the infinite regress. Coeckelbergh
replaces the metaphor of the chariot, with that of a ship with a compass
(reason) pointing to a magnetic North Pole (the good). In the
Augustinian version, the magnetic pole is no longer the good, but God.
Thus, Coeckelbergh constructs his 'extended ideal of autonomy' as 'a
plausible and acceptable ideal of a person on the basis of the existing
dominant modern ideal but leavened with the best insights of the ancient
one'. This construction, however, leaves us with three problems. Modern
people do not accept good or God as a source of normative authority.
When normative authority is also moral authority, I am no longer free to
choose evil. And it remains to be explained how I can be autonomous when
I depend on ‘the good’ or ‘God’.
In a second part of his book, Coeckelbergh proceeds to look for possible
alternatives to his 'extended modern ideal'. Three questions impose
themselves: Is it possible to find a less metaphysically compromising
extension? Can I depend on something that is 'not me' and still be
autonomous? If I know the good or God, can I still act badly?
A first rival view is the Sartrean. If choice is to be a part of ideal
of autonomy, the Sartrean notion of 'groundless choice' is not a
suitable candidate. As for the 'volitional necessity' of the 'later
Frankfurt', since there is no distinction between cares that are morally
good and cares that are morally wrong, there is no capacity to evaluate
our 'deepest attachments', and hence no limit to the hierarchy of
desires, and no answer to the question wither I can still care or love
something I know to be evil. Hill seems to present a metaphysically
economical ideal of autonomy. But the questions remains how a person can
make a choice between duty and inclination, without introducing
something that is not metaphysically economical. Kant's view is able to
deal with the problems mentioned above, but at the cost of involving
costly metaphysical claims. It excludes dependency since it is the will
that gives the moral law to itself. And it deals with the problem of
choice of doing evil, even when the question remains on what grounds I
can choose to be autonomous or 'pathological'.
The conclusion must be that the construction of a coherent ideal of the
autonomous person is impossible without making some costly metaphysical
claims. Coeckelbergh does not force anybody to accept the existence of
the good or God or an intelligible world, or to strive for the ideal of
autonomy. He just argues that you cannot have just one of them.
©
Stefan
Beyst,
February
2005
A review (in Dutch) is available in the
March 2005 issue of the philosophy journal
ANTW (Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte).
Visit the website of Mark
Coeckelbergh
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Coeckelbergh,
Mark: |
'The Metaphysics of Autonomy.
The Reconciliation of
Ancient and Modern Ideals of the Person',
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. |
can be ordered at |
Palgrave
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